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Abstract
How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in the capital regulation
of commercial banks? This paper builds a quantitative general equilibrium model with
commercial banks and shadow banks to study the unintended consequences of capital
requirements. A key feature of our model are defaultable bank liabilities that provide
liquidity services to households. The quality of the liquidity services provided by bank
liabilities depends on their safety in case of default. Commercial bank debt is fully
insured and thus provides full liquidity. However, commercial banks do not internalize
the social costs of higher leverage in the form of greater bankruptcy losses (moral haz-
ard), and are subject to a regulatory capital requirement. In contrast, shadow bank
liabilities are subject to runs and credit risk and thus typically less liquid compared to
commercial banks. Shadow banks endogenously limit their leverage as they internalize
its costs. Tightening the commercial banks’ capital requirement from the status quo
leads to safer commercial banks and more shadow banking activity in the economy.
While the safety of the financial system increases, it provides less liquidity. Calibrating
the model to data from the Financial Accounts of the U.S., the optimal capital require-
ment is around 15%.
∗First draft: December 2015. Email addresses: jbegenau@hbs.edu, tim.landvoigt@mccombs.utexas.edu.
We would like to thank our discussants Christian Opp, Goncalo Gino, David Chapman, and Hendrik Hakenes,
as well as seminar participants at the ASSA 2016 meetings, CITE 2015 conference on New Quantitative
Models of Financial Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Kellogg, MFM Winter 2016 meeting, NYU
Junior Macro-Finance 2016 Meeting, SAFE 2016 Conference on Regulating Financial Markets, SFI Lausanne,
Stanford Junior Faculty Workshop on Financial Regulation and Banking, Texas Finance Festival, University
of Texas at Austin, WFA 2016, and SED Toulouse 2016.
1
1 Introduction
The regulation of a complex system such as the financial sector may have unintended conse-
quences that can jeopardize the goals of regulatory policies. If regulated financial firms are
competing with unregulated financial firms that provide similar services or products, then
tighter regulation can cause a shift to the unregulated sector and thus potentially cause more
financial instability. For example, Regulation Q – a cap on deposit rates – was introduced
after the Great Depression to curb excessive competition for deposit funds that were thought
to have weakened the banking system. As long as interest rates remained low, savers had
little incentives to pull their funds out of the traditional banking system. But as soon interest
rates rose, depositors looked for alternatives and the competition for their savings generated
one: money market mutual funds (Adrian and Ashcraft (2012)). This and numerous other
examples1 highlight the side-effects of regulatory policies that can influence shadow banks’
behavior.2
In this paper, we study and quantify the effects of capital requirements in a general
equilibrium model that features regulated (commercial) and unregulated (shadow) banks.
Tightening the capital requirement on commercial banks can shift activity to shadow banks,
and thereby potentially increase the fragility of the entire financial system. Calibrating the
model to aggregate data from the Flow of Funds, we find that higher capital requirements
indeed shift activity away from traditional banks, potentially increasing shadow bank fragility
1Asset-backed commercial paper conduits are another example for entities that emerged arguably as a
response to regulation, more precisely capital regulation (see Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)).
2We define shadow banks as financial institutions that share features of depository institutions, either
by providing liquidity services such as money market mutual funds or by providing credit either directly
(e.g. finance companies) or indirectly (e.g. security-broker and dealers). At the same time, they are not
subject to the same regulatory supervision as traditional banks. Importantly, we adopt a consolidated view
of the shadow banking sector, i.e. money market mutual funds invest in commercial paper that fund security
brokers-dealers that provide credit. We view this intermediation chain as essentially being carried out by one
intermediary. In our definition of shadow banks, we abstract from shadow banks as a form of commercial
banks’ off-balance sheet vehicles as our focus is on liquidity provision of banks.
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and leverage. However, the aggregate banking system becomes safer. Welfare is maximized
at a capital requirement of roughly 15%.
We derive this result in a production economy with households, commercial banks, shadow
banks, capital goods producers, and a regulator.3 The main features of our model are risk-
neutral heterogeneous banks that make productive investments, have the option to default,
and differ in their ability to guarantee the safety of their liabilities. At the same time, risk-
averse households have preferences for safe and liquid assets in the form of bank liabilities
whose liquidity value depends on their safety. Matching the model to aggregate data from
the Flow of Funds as well as the Federal Reserve, Moody’s, and the FDIC, we find an optimal
capital requirement for commercial banks that is higher compared to current regulation. The
optimal requirement finds the welfare maximizing balance between a reduction in liquidity
services and the increase in the safety of the financial sector and consumption.
Key to this result are (i) the different economic forces that determine the leverage of
each type of bank, and (ii) the relative quality of the liquidity services produced by either
type of bank. The model economy features two production technologies for the consumption
good. One technology is accessed by households directly through their ownership of a tree
that produces an endowment of the good stochastically. The second technology is a linear,
stochastic production technology that uses capital owned by intermediaries. Banks compete
over capital shares and intermediate access to the capital’s payoff. Their assets are funded
by issuing equity and debt to households. When either type of bank defaults on its debt,
its equity becomes worthless and a fraction of the remaining bank value is destroyed in
bankruptcy.
Shadow bank debt is risky for households because the government only randomly bails out
shadow banking debt. Moreover, following Allen and Gale (1994), a fraction of depositors
3Figure 1 gives an overview of the model.
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may run on shadow bank debt which requires shadow banks to sell off a fraction of their assets
in a fire–sale. This fraction is endogenous and depends negatively on the fire sale discount
and positively on shadow bank leverage. Thus, shadow bank leverage does not only increase
the default probability of shadow banks but also the severity of bank runs during which their
assets are less productive. Shadow bank debt is thus risky for investors, which they take into
account. That is, the price at which shadow banks issue debt takes into account the default
probability implied by their leverage choice, up to the random bailout chance. Shadow banks
internalize this trade-off and limit their leverage endogenously. In contrast, commercial bank
debt is insured and therefore always safe. However, commercial banks do not internalize
that higher leverage makes costly bankruptcy more likely. Therefore, they do not take into
account the social costs of higher leverage in the form of greater bankruptcy losses that the
government imposes on households through lump sum taxation.
We match the model to aggregate data from the Flow of Funds on financial positions
of U.S. households and financial institutions, interest rates from Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED), and Compustat for publicly traded shadow banks (e.g. security-broker and
dealers, finance companies).
Quantitatively, our results depend on household preferences for liquidity and the relative
riskiness of shadow banks and commercial banks. Liquidity is affected by three key param-
eters: the share of liquidity services relative to consumption, the elasticity of substitution
between shadow– and commercial banking debt, and the sensitivity of the liquidity quality
of shadow banking debt with regard to the default rate in the shadow banking sector. We
infer these parameters from an estimate for the convenience yield of government debt from
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) that we apply to commercial banking debt,
the share of shadow bank activity (1/3) estimated by Gallin (2013), and the rate on shadow
banking that we proxy with the average quarterly rate of AA commercial paper from FRED,
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respectively.
The relative riskiness depends on the random bailout probability and the riskiness of
banks’ investment opportunities. As the bailout probability lowers the incentives of shadow
banks to internalize the risk of their leverage choice, we infer the first parameter from the
value weighted-average leverage of shadow banks using Compustat data, where the shadow
bank definition includes security broker dealers, GSEs, finance- and investment companies.
We target a 1% annual default rate for commercial banks and the cross-sectional volatilities
of shadow and commercial banks’ market–to–book ratios.
Increasing the capital requirement means that for every dollar of assets, commercial banks
can issue fewer debt and produce less liquidity services, which reduces welfare. At the same,
it reduces the bankruptcy rate of commercial banks and the associated deadweight losses. In
an economy without shadow banks, this would be the key trade-off determining the optimal
capital requirement.
In the economy with shadow banks, however, we find that higher capital requirements
shift intermediation activity from commercial to shadow banks. The reduced liquidity pro-
duction by commercial banks following tighter regulation increases the attractiveness of all
types of bank liabilities as well as the value of banking in general. This causes the funding
costs of shadow banks to decrease, and effectively increases shadow banks’ demand for the
intermediated capital. The resulting greater market share of shadow banks might offset the
gain from making commercial banks safer through a higher capital requirement.
The net effect then crucially depends on the riskiness of shadow banks. If shadow banks
are more fragile than commercial banks, the greater share of intermediation performed by
shadow banks may dominate the gain in stability from safer commercial banks. However, in
our calibrated model shadow banks are only moderately riskier than commercial banks and
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do not increase their leverage in response to the raised capital charge. The reason is that the
quality of their liquidity services negatively depends on shadow bank default risk. Therefore
the degree to which shadow bank liabilities can be substituted for insured deposits is limited,
and shadow banks only partially replace the quantity of debt produced by commercial banks.
Hence we find a net positive effect despite an expansion in shadow bank activity.
We also find that the exact level of the optimal capital requirement depends on the implicit
bailout probability of shadow banks. If this probability is high, shadow banks are relatively
risky, and there is only a limited gain from shifting intermediation activity to shadow banks
through a greater capital requirement. In this case, which is our benchmark calibration,
the optimal capital requirement is around 15 percent of assets. In a counterfactual scenario
with a lower bailout probability for shadow banks, shadow banks act more efficiently and
therefore pose less risk for financial instability if their intermediation share becomes larger.
This leads to higher welfare gains when the capital requirement is increased. The dynamic
model further shows that a greater deposit insurance fee for commercial banks does not lead
to a safer financial system. While a higher fee shifts activity to the riskier shadow banks, it
does not – unlike the capital requirement – make commercial banks sufficiently safer. Finally,
we introduce a time-varying capital requirement that is set such that the expected default
rate of commercial banks is lower than 25 basis point p.a. The resulting time-varying capital
requirement has a mean of 13% and is tighter during booms, particularly during booms of
the financial sector.
Related Literature
Our paper is part of a growing literature at the intersection of macroeconomics and bank-
ing that tries to understand optimal regulation of banks in a quantitative general equilibrium
framework.4 Our modeling approach draws on the recent literature on the role of financial in-
4E.g. Begenau (2015), Christiano and Ikeda (2013), Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2015),
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termediaries in the macroeconomy.5 These papers study economies with assets that investors
can only access through an intermediary, as in our paper. The wealth of the intermediary
then emerges as an additional state variable driving asset prices and the dynamics of the
economy. By introducing limited liability and deposit insurance, and by defining the role
of banks as liquidity producers, we bridge the gap to a long-standing microeconomic litera-
ture on the function of banks in the economy. Several recent papers in this literature study
the interaction of different types of banks that differ in the extent of regulation and bailout
guarantees.6
Our paper is most closely related to Moreira and Savov (2014), Huang (2015), and Gertler,
Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016). Moreira and Savov (2014) study an intermediary asset
pricing economy with two types of assets that differ in suitability as collateral for issuing safe
and liquid liabilities (money). They demonstrate that the presence of shadow banks can lead
to increased economic volatility as rational investors try to determine the liquidity of the debt
issued by the financial sector. Huang (2015) models shadow banks as an off-balance sheet
financing option for regular banks within the Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) framework.
Financial stability is a U-shaped function of financial regulation (i.e. very tight regulation
generates more off-balance activities). Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) construct a
quantitative macro-finance framework with a role for both regular banks (retail) and shadow
banks (wholesale). Bank runs occur endogenously and allow the model to capture important
features of the recent financial crisis. Our definition of banks is closely related to Gertler,
Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016). A key difference to other work is our focus on liquidity
provision as a fundamental role of banking and moral hazard arising endogenously from
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016). See Nguyen (2014) and Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014) for quantita-
tive models in partial equilibrium.
5E.g. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011),
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015), Moreira and Savov (2014).
6E.g. Goodhart, Kashyap, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis (2012), Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013),
Plantin (2014), Harris, Opp, and Opp (2015)
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deposit insurance and limited liability.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 the main
mechanism. Section 4 shows how we map the model to the data and presents the policy
experiments.
2 A Model of the Banking System
This section presents the general equilibrium model economy. For a quick overview of the
model see Figure 1. We discuss the key assumptions of the model in section 2.2.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. Households maximize utility from consuming
goods and liquidity services. The economy receives an endowment of the consumption good
which households directly own. Further, the economy features productive capital which
households can only access through financial intermediaries. Two types of intermediaries,
C-banks and S-banks, can perform the intermediation. That is, they each hold a fraction
of the aggregate capital stock and produce the consumption good using a linear stochastic
production technology. New capital is produced by capital goods producers who sell it to
intermediaries. Banks issue short-term debt and equity to households to fund the purchase
of capital. The short term debt of both banks provides households with liquidity services.
Both type of banks can declare bankruptcy and default on their debt. However, the debt
of C-banks is riskfree to households since the government provides deposit insurance for C-
banks. In return, C-banks are subject to capital regulation. S-banks, on the other hand,
are not subject to regulation that limits their leverage. Their debt is risky for households
since debt of defaulting S-banks only pays off a fraction of the face value. S-banks take into
account the effect of their leverage choice on the expected payoff of their debt, and hence
endogenously choose to limit their leverage. Moreover, a fraction of households may run on
8
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Figure 1: Model Overview
shadow bank debt forcing a fraction of shadow banks’ assets into a fire sale that lowers their
productivity.
2.1 Detailed Model Description
Agents and Environment Time is discrete and infinite. Households receive stochastic
income from a tree, Yt. In addition, the economy has a capital stock Kt, with each unit of
capital producing output Zt. Capital is produced by capital goods producers that sell new
capital to intermediaries. After producing, capital depreciates at the rate δK . Households
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do not own this type of capital directly. Rather, the two types of intermediaries finance
purchases of this capital by issuing equity and debt to households. This captures the idea
that households use banks to finance durable goods such as housing and cars. Banks have
limited liability, i.e., they can choose to declare bankruptcy. Shadow banks are subject to
partial bank runs, in the sense that a fraction of depositors may decide to withdraw their
funds before the payoff of the assets is realized, and forcing the shadow bank to liquidate
part of their assets in fire-sales. Deposit insurance prevents bank runs on commercial banks.
Investment There is a capital producing firm that is fully owned by households and maxi-
mizes its profit ΠIt . This firm can buy units of the consumption good and turns them into units
of capital (that produce output Zt). To generate It units of capital, the capital-producing
firm needs to expend
It + Φ(It)
units of the consumption good, with Φ′(It) > 0, Φ′′(It) > 0, and Φ(0) = 0.
S-Banks There is a unit mass of S-banks, indexed by i. S-bank i holds KSt,i units of
capital at the beginning of period t. The shares trade at a market price of pt. To fund their
investment, S-banks can issue short term debt. The debt of S-bank i trades at the price qSt,i.
At the beginning of the period, S-bank i has BSt,i bonds outstanding.
The payoff per unit of capital held by bank i is Zt. Each period, S-banks face idiosyncratic
valuation risks ρSt,i that are proportional to the market value of their assets, with ρ
S
t,i ∼ F Sρ
and E(ρSt,i) = 1, i.i.d. across banks and time. At the beginning of each period (after observing
ρSt,i), S-banks can decide to declare bankruptcy. In case of a bankruptcy, banks’ equity is
wiped out, and their assets are seized by their creditors. Further, the bank’s managers incur
a utility penalty, that is, a fraction δS of the value of the bank’s assets.
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We define book leverage bSt,i =
BSt,i
KSt,i
and market leverage
LSt,i =
BSt,i
KSt,i (Zt + (1− δK)pt)
=
bSt,i
(Zt + (1− δK)pt) . (1)
Shadow banks are exposed to aggregate run-risk. That is, a fraction of shadow bank
deposits % is withdrawn early within a given period (affecting all shadow banks equally),
where %St ∈ {0, %∗ > 0}, following a two-state Markov chain. When deposits are withdrawn,
shadow banks need to liquidate a fraction `St,i of their assets. Assets that are liquidated early
are sold at price p
t
in a separate market at the beginning of the period and do not yield any
payoff to the bank. The buyers of these assets are households. Households have an inferior
ability to operate the asset, leading to a lower payoff Zt < Zt and a higher depreciation rate
δK > δK . Households sell the asset again in the regular market later in the same period.
Household optimization implies that the fire-sale price is7
p
t
= (1− δK)pt + Zt. (2)
We define the fire-sale discount
xt =
(1− δK)pt + Zt
(1− δK)pt + Zt < 1.
To pay out its depositors in case of a withdrawal shock (%St = %
∗), the bank must sell %∗BSt
worth of assets. We assume that the liquidation sale takes place before the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock ρSt,i and the bankruptcy decision. Hence the fraction of assets that needs
to be liquidated is
`St,i =
%St B
S
t,i
KSt,ipt
=
%St L
S
t,i
xt
,
using the definition of leverage and the fire-sale discount.
7Since both transactions take place within the same period and households are unconstrained, it imme-
diately follows that p
t
must be equal to the marginal product of capital to households, which is equivalent
to equation (2). Also, note that the marginal product of capital to households is always lower than that of
firms, so households do never optimally own any capital at the end of the period.
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Since the idiosyncratic valuation shocks are uncorrelated over time, it is convenient to
write the optimization problem of surviving banks after the bankruptcy decision and asset
payoffs. All banks have the same value and face identical problems:
max
KSt+1,B
S
t+1
qSt B
S
t+1 − ptKSt+1
+Et
[
Mt,t+1max
{
ρSt+1K
S
t+1
(
`St+1pt+1+
+(1− `St+1) (Zt+1 + (1− δK) pt+1)
)−BSt+1,−δSKSt+1 (Zt+1 + (1− δK) pt+1)}] .
Using the definitions for book- and market leverage we rewrite the maximum operator, i.e.
the continuation value, as
KSt max
{
ρSt
(
`St pt +
(
1− `St
)
(Zt + (1− δK) pt)
)
− bSt ,−δS (Zt + (1− δK)pt)
}
= KSt (Zt + (1− δK) pt)
(
1
[
ρSt ≥
LSt − δS
1− `St (1− xt)
] (
ρSt
(
1− `St (1− xt)
)− LSt )
−1
[
ρSt <
LSt − δS
1− `St (1− xt)
]
δS
)
.
Taking the expectation of this expression with respect to ρSt , one obtains
KSt (Zt + (1− δK) pt) ×[(
1− F Sρ
(
LSt − δS
1− `St (1− xt)
))(
ρS,+t
(
1− `St (1− xt)
)− LSt )− F Sρ ( LSt − δS1− `St (1− xt)
)
δS
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:≡ FS(LSt )
where ρS,+t = E
(
ρSt | ρSt > L
S
t −δS
1−`St (1−xt)
)
, F Sρ
(
LSt −δS
1−`St (1−xt)
)
is the probability of default, and
FS (LSt ) describes the leverage- and run-adjusted payoff of S-banks’ portfolio, including the
default option. The payoff is higher the lower banks’ leverage, the lower the fraction of liq-
uidated assets `t, the closer fire-sale prices are to regular market prices xt, and the lower the
utility penalty.
We can now define the per-asset value function
vS(Zt) = max
bSt+1
qSt b
S
t+1 − pt + Et
[
Mt,t+1(Zt+1 + (1− δK)pt+1)FS
(
LSt+1
)]
, (3)
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such that the full optimization problem of the S-bank is given by
max
KSt+1
KSt+1v
S(Zt),
subject to KSt+1 ≥ 0.
C-Banks There is a unit mass of C-banks. C-banks are different from S-banks in three
ways: (i) they issue short-term debt that is insured and risk free from the perspective of
creditors, (ii) they are subject to regulatory capital requirements, and (iii) they are not
subject to run risk, i.e. %Ct = 0 and thus `
C
t = 0 ∀t . They pay an insurance fee of κ for
each bond they issue. Using the same notation as for S-banks, the problem of all surviving
C-banks is identical and given by
max
KCt+1
KCt+1v
C(Zt),
subject to KCt+1 ≥ 0, and where the per-asset value is given by
vC(Zt) = max
bCt+1
(qCt − κ)bCt+1 − pt + Et
[
Mt,t+1(Zt+1 + (1− δK)pt+1)F(LCt+1)
]
, (4)
subject to the equity requirement
(1− θ)pt ≥ bCt . (5)
Bankruptcy The idiosyncratic asset valuation shock is realized at the beginning of each
period before any decisions have been made.
If a bank declares bankruptcy, its equity becomes worthless, and creditors seize all of the
banks assets, which are liquidated. The recovery amount per bond issued is hence
rj(Ljt) = (1− ξj)
ρj,−t
(
`jtpt +
(
1− `jt
)
(Zt + (1− δK) pt)
)
Kjt
Bjt
= (1− ξj)ρ
j,−
t
(
1− `jt (1− xt)
)
Ljt
, (6)
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for j = S,C, with a fraction ξj lost in the bankruptcy proceedings, and with ρj,−t =
E
(
ρjt | ρjt <
(
Ljt−δj
1−`St (1−xt)
))
. For shadow banks the recovery value is also decreasing in the
amount of assets that need to be liquidated as well as the discount (smaller xt). After the
bankruptcy proceedings are completed, a new bank is set up to replace the failed one. This
bank sells its equity to new owners, and is otherwise identical to a surviving bank after asset
payoffs.
If a S-bank defaults, the recovery value per bond is used to pay the claims of bondholders
to the extent possible. We further consider the possibility that the government bails out the
bond holders of the defaulting S-bank with a probability piB, known to all agents ex ante.
If a C-bank declares bankruptcy, the bank is taken over by the government that uses lump
sum taxes and revenues from deposit insurance, κBCt+1, to pay out the bank’s creditors in
full. Summing up over defaulting C-banks and S-banks that are bailed out, lump sum taxes
are defined
Tt = F
C
ρ,t
(
1− rC(bCt )
)
BCt − κBCt+1 + piBF Sρ,t
(
1− rS(bSt )
)
BSt .
The beginning-of period dividend paid by banks to households, conditional on survival,
for S-banks is
DSt = ρ
S,+
t K
S
t
(
`St pt +
(
1− `St
)
(Zt + (1− δK) pt)
)
−BSt +KSt+1
(
qSt b
S
t+1 − pt
)
,
and for C-banks
DCt = ρ
C,+
t K
C
t (Zt + (1− δK)pt)−BCt +KCt+1
(
(qCt − κ)bCt+1 − pt
)
.
Households Households derive utility from the consumption Ct of the fruit of the Y -tree
and the fraction of output ZtKt that is not invested. Households hold a portfolio of all
securities that both types of intermediaries issue. In particular, they buy equity shares of
14
both types of intermediaries, Sjt , that trade at price of p
j
t , for j = S,C respectively. They
further buy the short terms bonds both types issue, N jt , trading at prices q
j
t , for j = S,C.
Households consume the liquidity services provided by the short term debt they hold at
the beginning of the period. This reflects that the liquidity services accrue at the time when
the deposits from last period are redeemed. Let N jt =
´ 1
0
N jt,i di, for j = S,C. Then the total
liquidity services produced are
H(NSt , N
C
t ),
and household utility in period t is
U(Ct, H(N
S
t , N
C
t )).
We specify utility as
U(Ct, H
(
NSt , N
C
t
)
) =
(
C
(
t1− ψ)Hψt
)1−γ
1− γ ,
with
H
(
NSt , N
C
t
)
=
[
ΛS,t
(
NSt
)
α +
(
NCt
)
α
]1/α
.
The elasticity of substitution between the two types of bank liabilities is 1/(1− α).
We define the weight on the liquidity services of shadow banks ΛS,t as follows:
ΛS,t = (1− F Sρ,t)ν ,
with ν > 0. The liquidity productivity of shadow banks is lower than that of commercial
banks. The discount depends on the fraction of surviving shadow banks, introducing endoge-
nous time-variation in the quality of liquidity services.
Households further receive the profit ΠIt of the capital producing firm.
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Denoting household wealth at the beginning of the period by Wt, the complete intertem-
poral problem of households is
V H(Wt, Yt, N
S
t , N
C
t ) = max
Ct,NSt ,N
C
t ,S
S
t ,S
C
t
U(Ct, H
(
NSt , N
C
t
)
) + β Et [V (Wt+1, Yt+1)]
subject to
Wt + Yt + Π
I
t − Tt = Ct +
∑
j=S,C
pjtS
j
t +
∑
j=S,C
qjtN
j
t (7)
Wt+1 =
∑
j=S,C
(1− F jρ
(
Ljt+1
)
)
(
Djt+1 + p
j
t+1
)
Sjt
+NSt
[
1− F Sρ
(
LSt+1
)
+ F Sρ
(
LSt+1
) (
piB + (1− piB) rSt+1
)]
+NCt . (8)
The budget constraint in equation (7) shows that households spend their wealth and income
on consumption and purchases of equity and debt of both types of intermediaries. The
securities issued are the same for all banks, independent of the previous bankruptcy status.
The equity purchases for banks that have gone through bankruptcy at the beginning of
period t can be understood as initial equity offerings for these banks, while the purchases of
equity of surviving banks are in a secondary market. However, since both new and surviving
banks hold identical portfolios, their securities have the same price and there is no need to
distinguish primary and secondary markets.8
8It is possible to show that the price to an equity claim of bank types j, pjt , is equal to the value of that
bank’s security portfolio, Kjt+1pt − qjtBjt+1.
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Market Clearing Asset markets
KSt+1 +K
C
t+1 = It + (1− δK)
(
1− ξCFCρ,tρC,−t
)
KCt (9)
+
(
1− δK − `St (δK − δK)
) (
1− ξSF Sρ,tρS,−t
)
KSt (10)
BSt = N
S
t
BCt = N
C
t
SSt = 1
SCt = 1. (11)
Goods market
Ct = Yt − It − Φ(It) + Zt
(
1− ξCFCρ,tρC,−t
)
KCt
+
(
Zt − `St (Zt − Zt)
) (
1− ξSF Sρ,tρS,−t
)
KSt . (12)
The market clearing condition for capital in (10) is also the transition law for the aggregate
capital stock. Note that bank failures lead to additional depreciation that is endogenously
determined through the failure rates of banks, F jρ (L
j
t). Similarly, bank failures also lead to an
output loss in the goods market, as can be seen in market clearing condition for consumption
goods (12).
2.2 Discussion of assumptions
Banks’ Role as Intermediaries In the model, banks are special because they provide
liquidity (discussed below) and also help to produce the consumption good. The role of
banks as intermediaries can be derived from first principles in numerous ways. For example,
in models with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, lenders with access
to a cheaper screening or monitoring technology than other lenders (regular households)
become banks (see Freixas and Rochet (1998) for many other examples). In our formulation
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banks own the production technology directly which is similar to Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014), that is we abstract from any frictions between producers and banks.
The Role of Banks as Liquidity Providers In this model, households value bank debt
because it is liquid9 and safe, an interpretation of bank debt in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)
and in Gorton et al. (2012). The notion of safe and liquid assets includes bank deposits,
money market fund shares, commercial paper, repos, short-term interbank loans, Treasuries,
agency and municipal debt, securitized debt, and high-grade financial sector corporate debt.
Aside from the government, commercial banks and shadow banks are the most important
providers of these securities.10 The savings glut hypothesis articulated in Bernanke (2005)
and other recent work (e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), Gorton, Lewellen, and
Metrick (2012), and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)) rests on the notion that
there exists a demand for safe and liquid securities. Economic agents demanding these
assets are for example households that hold deposits for transaction or liquidity reasons
as well as corporations, institutional investors, and high net worth individuals that carry
large cash-balances and seek safe and liquid investment vehicles with higher yields than
deposits, such as money market mutual funds. Commercial banks provide mostly deposits,
but also issue money market fund shares, repos, and commercial paper. Some of these
securities that commercial banks hold (most notably deposits) are explicitly insured through
deposit insurance. Others, such as money market fund shares and commercial papers are
indirectly insured due to government guarantees.11 Shadow banks generally do not benefit
from government guarantees. Nevertheless outside of recessions and banking crisis, money
9The idea to view banks as liquidity provider goes back to Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Other work has
built upon this idea (e.g. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)).
10Historically, money market mutual funds (a type of shadow bank) emerged precisely to satisfy demand
for safe and liquid assets when Regulation Q imposed a ceiling on deposit rates.
11A number of empirical papers presents evidence for market expectations for government guarantees on
U.S. banks (see for instance Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Gandhi and Lustig (2013)).
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market mutual funds shares and collateralized short term funding sources such as repo are
considered safe and liquid.
In the model, liquidity services are generated through debt issued by shadow banks and
commercial banks. Commercial bank debt represents all commercial bank liabilities precisely
because the demand for safe and liquid assets goes beyond merely deposits. We apply the
same idea to shadow bank debt with one notable difference: the value of shadow bank
liabilities depends on the likelihood at which shadow banks default.
Liquidity services in households preference We capture the idea that bank liabilities
provide liquidity services with our utility specification. The households in our model represent
a blend of different agents with demands for different types of safe and liquid assets (deposits,
money market mutual fund shares, and so forth) provided by all financial institutions. This
is why our utility specification aggregates the liquidity services of both bank types.
Commercial bank debt always provides liquidity services no matter their default proba-
bility. This is different for shadow banks as the value from their liquidity service depends
on their probability of default. This captures the idea that shadow bank debt is only safe as
long as shadow banks are safe, that is, not too many of them go bankrupt.
The demand for liquidity services is captured with a money-in-the-utility function specifi-
cation. Since Sidrauski (1967) money-in-the-utility specifications have been used to capture
the benefits from money-like-securities for households in macroeconomic models. Feenstra
(1986) proved the functional equivalence of models with money-in-the-utility and models
with transaction or liquidity costs. The specific functional form is a version of Poterba and
Rotemberg (1986).
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2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
This section characterizes the equilibrium, i.e. stating the important first order conditions.
Capital Good Producers Capital goods producers maximize profits each period by
choosing investment output
max
It
ptIt − It − Φ(It),
which yields the typical first-oder condition tying the price of capital to the marginal cost of
investment
pt = 1 + Φ
′(It).
Household The household’s first-order conditions for purchases of bank equity are, for
j = S,C,
pjt = Et
[
Mt,t+1
(
1− F jρ (Lt+1)
) (
Djt+1 + p
j
t+1
)]
,
where we have defined the stochastic discount factor
Mt,t+1 = β
U1(Ct+1, Ht+1)
U1(Ct, Ht)
.
We further define the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and liquidity services
Qt =
U2(Ct, Ht)
U1(Ct, Ht)
,
where
U1 = (1− ψ)C(1−γ)(1−ψ)−1Hψ(1−γ) (13)
U2 = ψC
(1−γ)(1−ψ)H(1−γ)ψ−1 (14)
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and consequently
Qt =
ψ
1− ψ
Ct
Ht
.
Then the first-order conditions for purchases of bonds of either type of bank are
qCt = QtΛC,t
(
Ht
NCt
)1−α
+ Et [Mt,t+1] , (15)
qSt = QtΛS,t
(
Ht
NSt
)1−α
+ Et
{
Mt,t+1
[
1− F Sρ
(
LSt+1
)
+ F Sρ
(
LSt+1
) (
piB + (1− piB) rS(LSt+1)
)]}
.
(16)
The payoff of commercial bank bonds is 1, whereas the payoff of shadow bank bonds
depends on their default probability and recovery value. The first terms in each expression
represent the marginal benefit of liquidity services to households.
Banks S-banks are subject to an endogenous borrowing constraint. Each S-bank is effec-
tively a monopolist for its own debt, as it internalizes the effect of supplying additional bonds
on the bond price.
Specifically, each S-bank views the price of its debt as a function of its supply of bonds
qSt = q(b
S
t+1) that is determined by households’ first order condition in equation 16.
It follows from differentiating equation (3) that the FOC of S-banks for leverage is12
q(bSt+1) + b
S
t+1 q
′(bSt+1) = Et
[
Mt+1(1− F St+1)
(
1 + `t+1(1− xt+1) ρ
S,+
t+1
LSt+1
)]
. (17)
The partial derivative q′(bSt+1) can be obtained directly from households’ FOC for purchases
of shadow bank debt. Differentiating equation (16) yields
12Appendix A.1 contains details of the derivations in this section.
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∂qS(bSt+1)
∂bSt+1
= −Et
{
(1− piB)Mt,t+1
[
F St+1r
S
t+1
bSt+1(1− `t+1(1− xt+1))
+
fSt+1
bSt+1
LS(LSt+1)
(
(1− ξS)δS + ξSLSt+1
)]}
,
(18)
where
LS(LSt+1) =
1− δS`t+1 1−xt+1LSt+1
(1− `t+1(1− xt+1))2 .
The RHS of equation 18 is strictly negative, implying that the price of shadow bank debt
is decreasing in shadow bank leverage bSt+1. The first term reflects that the recovery value
per bond in case of bankruptcy decreases if the shadow bank issues more debt. The second
term is the loss for lenders from a marginal increase in the probability of default.
S-bank leverage LSt+1 is determined by combining equations (17) and (18), and substituting
for the bond price from households’ first-order condition (16).
The debt price of commercial banks is independent of their leverage choice. Therefore the
FOC of C-banks for leverage is
qCt − κ = λCt + Et
[
Mt,t+1(1− FCρ,t+1)
]
. (19)
with λCt being the Lagrange multiplier on the leverage constraint in equation (5). This FOC
and the household FOC for purchases of commercial bank debt (15) jointly imply that the
Lagrange multiplier is positive and hence the C−bank leverage constraint is binding, i.e.
(1− θ)pt = bCt .
To be precise, the condition13 for a binding leverage requirement is
λCt = QtΛC,t
(
Ht
NCt
)1−α
+ Et
[
Mt,t+1F
C
ρ,t+1
]− κ > 0.
13This condition is derived from combining the FOC of commercial banks with respect to leverage with
household’s FOC with respect to debt.
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The first term is the marginal value of liquidity services derived from commercial bank
deposits. As long as households are not satiated with liquidity, the marginal value is positive.
The second term is the expected discounted value in case of default of carrying one unit of
resources into the next period, which is positive as long as commercial banks default with
some probability FCρ,t+1 > 0. The last term is the deposit insurance fee. Taken together, this
means that a small enough κ implies that the leverage requirement will always bind. This is
the case for the parametrization we consider.14
The first-order conditions for asset purchases Kjt+1 follow from the constant returns to
scale (i.e. zero-profit) nature of each type’s problem, requiring vS(Zt) = 0 and v
C(Zt) = 0,
respectively, which yields
pt = q
S
t b
S
t+1 + Et
[
Mt,t+1(Zt+1 + (1− δK)pt+1)FS(LSt+1)
]
,
pt = (q
C
t − κ)bCt+1 + Et
[
Mt,t+1(Zt+1 + (1− δK)pt+1)FC(LCt+1)
]
.
3 Main Mechanism
This section describes the main mechanism in the deterministic version of the model. Banks
have to choose their size (capital stock share) and leverage.
Banks’ leverage choice The leverage choice of C-banks is determined by their FOC for
bC
qC − κ = λC + β(1− FC). (20)
14Conversely, if a regulator could set
κ > MRSC,t + Et
[
Mt,t+1F
C
ρ,t+1
] ∀ t,
commercial banks may never choose leverage at the regulatory limit.
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Combining equation 20 with households’ FOC with respect to NC
qC = QΛC
(
H
NC
)1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:≡MRSC
+ β, (21)
one obtains
λC = MRSC + β
[
FC
]− κ > 0
for small enough values of κ. In other words, commercial banks’ leverage constraint is
always binding in the steady state.
As for C-banks, S-bank leverage per unit of assets is determined trough S-banks’ FOC for
bS, which in the steady state with ` = 0 can be written as
q(bS) + bS q′(bS) = β(1− F S). (22)
Comparing the FOC for C-bank leverage in (20) to the S-bank FOC in (22) above reveals
the fundamental difference between the two types of banks. While C-banks are subject to a
constant leverage constraint that in equilibrium is always binding, S-banks choose to limit
their leverage because they internalize the effect of their leverage choice on the price of their
deposits, qS.
Increasing leverage bS will decrease the survival probability F S and hence lower the value
of S-bank deposits to HH, implying ∂q
S(bS)
∂bS
< 0, as can be seen from the FOC of households
with regard to S-bank debt
qS = QΛS
(
H
NS
)1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:≡MRSS
+ β
[
1− F Sρ + F Sρ
(
piB + (1− piB) rS
)]
. (23)
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When choosing leverage, we assume that shadow banks take into account that their default
risk is priced. In this sense, each shadow bank acts as a monopolist for its own debt. But
it does not internalize how its leverage choice and default risk affects the value of liquidity
services for households. This is intuitive, as shadow bank bond prices are sensitive to the
specific default risk of the issuer. But they also move with changes in aggregate liquidity
conditions, which are caused by actions of all shadow banks, but not by any individual bank.
Thus, it is best to think of the changes in the value of aggregate liquidity services as an
externality arising in general equilibrium.
The following proposition states the resulting endogenous leverage choice of S-banks:
Proposition. Leverage LS of S-banks is
LS =
1
β
MRSS + F
S
ρ piB
ξS (1− piB) fS −
(1− ξS)
ξS
δS. (24)
Proposition 24 can be proven by combining households’ FOC with regard to S-bank debt
(equation 23) with shadow banks’ FOC (equation 22) and substituting for ∂q
S(bS)
∂bS
using the
steady state version of equation 18. The expression shows that shadow bank leverage rises
with the marginal benefit of shadow bank liquidity (MRSS) and the bailout probability.
Conversely, the bankruptcy cost ξS and the default penalty δS reduce leverage.
Size of the Banking Sectors & Procyclical Shadow Banking Activity The optimal
choice of capital share purchases Kj for each bank type j = C, S imply
vj(Z) = 0, (25)
for any Kj > 0.
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We can think of condition (25) as determining the relative size of the j-bank sector:
p− (qC − κ)bC =β (Z + (1− δK) p)FC, (26)
p− qSbS =β (Z + (1− δK) p)FS . (27)
For any reasonable parameter combinations, the above equilibrium choices of capital stock
purchases and leverage for both types of banks imply that C−banks have a dominant position
in the capital share (K
C
K
> K
S
K
). The intuitive reason for this equilibrium outcome is as
follows.
First, C-banks’ debt is insured and therefore C-banks do not internalize the effect of their
leverage choice on the price of their debt. Since the marginal liquidity benefit is always
positive, C-banks always exhaust their leverage constraint. S-banks, however, do internalize
the increase in their default risk. Hence, if C-banks and S-banks are fundamentally equally
risky, S-banks choose lower leverage15. Required initial equity for C-banks is p − qCbC .
Leverage LC is a constant and higher than that of S-banks if θ is sufficiently small. In
equilibrium, the bond price qC adjusts in order for marginal dividend to equal the marginal
cost of equity. For reasonable parameter combinations, this in turn means that the marginal
benefit of C-bank debt to households must be lower than that of S-bank debt. If debt is
further sufficiently substitutable, this means that C-banks must hold a greater share of the
intermediated asset in equilibrium.16
The exact split between both types of banks depends on several parameters, particularly
the elasticity of substitution between both kinds of liquidity α.
15This statement of course depends on the parameters of the model, in particular the value of θ, i.e. the
tightness of C-banks’ leverage constraint. For any values close to the capital requirements of commercial
banks, we found this statement to be true.
16Even for equal shares of asset holdings (K
C
K =
KS
K ), C-banks will produce N
C > NS due to their higher
leverage. If both types of debt are close to being complements, the higher leverage of C-banks by itself is
sufficient to create the lower marginal benefit. Thus the C-bank share is increasing in the elasticity parameter
α.
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The relative size of both banking sectors is determined in equilibrium by the marginal
benefit of opening each bank in this period and receiving dividends next period. Mathemati-
cally, this means that the holdings of the intermediated capital stock by both types of banks,
KC and KS, and thus the relative size of both banking sectors, are jointly determined by the
FOCs (26) and (27).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Determination of KC and KS for α = 0.56
Left-hand side (marginal cost, i.e. required equity, blue line) and right-hand side (marginal
benefit, red line) of banks’ first-order condition for asset holdings (Kj), while imposing market
clearing K = KC +KS and holding fixed all other variables.
Figure (2) shows the LHS and RHS of both equations graphically for the calibrated model,
depending on the current state of the economy.17 We first numerically compute the equi-
librium values of all variables. Then we vary the share of S-banks and C-banks, KS and
KC , while holding all other variables fixed (and imposing market clearing KS + KC = K).
The blue lines (i.e. the equity funding costs) trace the value of the LHS of the first-order
conditions (26) and (27) as we vary the shares, p− qjbj, for j = C, S, respectively. Holding
17In the deterministic model, the notion of state is not well defined. What we mean here by state is the
endowment value for which we solve the deterministic model. In the bad ”‘state”’, banking sector profitability
Z and household endowment Y are only 80% of the value in the good ”‘state”’.
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constant p and bj, the only source of variation is through the bond price qj. Since total debt
issued by each type is given by asset share times leverage per unit of assets, N j = bjKj, the
marginal benefit of deposits of each type changes as we vary the asset shares, as can be seen
from the pricing equations for the qj, (21) and (23). In particular, as we increase the share
of type j holding total provided liquidity constant, the marginal liquidity benefit of type j’s
deposits will decline (for any α < 1), and therefore type j’s bond price will also decline. This
means that the equity required to purchase the bank’s initial asset position becomes larger
for the same face amount of debt issued.
An opposing effect is that, as long as liquidity services provided by both types of debt
are imperfect substitutes, the marginal benefit derived from each type’s debt is also affected
by the composition of the total debt. When we increase the share of C-banks, we decrease
the share of S-banks due to market clearing, holding constant the aggregate capital stock.
Consequently the composition of liquidity services becomes more unequal and the amount
of services derived from total debt issued by both banks declines, which leads to a general
increase in the marginal benefit of both kinds of liquidity. Both effects, the pure effect of an
increase in the KC share and the equilibrium effect through the implied decrease in the KS
share can be seen in left panel of (2). Lowering the KS share from 0.8 to about 0.3 (= raising
the KC share from 0.2 to 0.7) causes a decrease in the marginal benefit of C-bank debt to
households, which in turn lowers the bond price qC and therefore raises the required initial
equity of C-banks (the blue line in the graph). By lowering the S-bank share any further,
the composition of debt becomes so unequal that the marginal benefit of any liquidity rises
again, causing both bond prices (also qC) to increase again. Hence the required equity of
C-banks bends backwards, yielding the overall non-monotonic shape.
The effect on the RHS of equation (27) is depicted by the red lines and quantitatively
smaller. The discounted expected dividend (per unit of assets) is not affected in the steady
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state by a variation in the share of KS. In the dynamic model, it will work through the
households’ discount factor which depends on consumption C.
The overall take-away from the left panel of figure (2) is that the FOC of C-banks is
satisfied at two points, the actual equilibrium share of K
C
K
= 0.60 (K
S
K
= 0.40) and an even
higher share of K
C
K
> 0.80. The unique equilibrium split is then determined by the FOC of
S-banks, depicted in the right panel of the figure. It also has two potential equilibria, but only
of which satisfies C-banks FOCs. The forces determining the shapes of required equity (blue
line) and expected dividend (red line) are the same as for C-banks. The unique intersection
with the expected discounted dividend of S-banks that satisfies the FOC of C-banks is at
KS
K
= 0.4.
The share of shadow banking activity also depends on the economic state as figure (2)
shows. In a boom (solid red line and dashed dashed blue line), shadow banks can issue
debt at a higher price because they are less likely to fail next period. Moreover, because
the default probability is lower, the expected dividend payment is larger. This means that
shadow banking activity is pro-cyclical.
Welfare-maximizing Capital Requirement The deterministic model delivers a quali-
tative welfare result with respect to the optimal capital requirement for C-banks, θ. The
general conditions for this result to obtain are
C1. C-banks are sufficiently risky such that there exists a range for low values of θ for which
some C-banks default, i.e. FC < 1.
C2. S-banks are at least as risky as C-banks; in other words, the standard deviation of their
idiosyncratic shocks σS is at least as large as that of C-banks.
C3. Households derive a strictly positive utility benefit from liquidity services (ψ > 0), and
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the liquidity services provided by C-banks are at least as good as those of S-banks.
Under these fairly general conditions there exists a trade-off in the model that leads to a
unique utility maximum in θ. Figure (3) illustrates the trade-off for two different values of
piB. In both instances increasing the capital requirement leads to an increase in consumption
(top right graph), as fewer C-banks default due to lower leverage and hence bankruptcy
losses become smaller. At the same time, decreasing C-bank leverage through tighter capital
requirements lowers the amount of liquidity services provided to households (bottom left), as
a greater share of the intermediated asset is shifted to S-banks (top left). Since total utility is
a weighted sum of both components, there exists a unique welfare maximum that trades off
the reduction in liquidity provision against the reduction in deadweight losses due to fewer
defaults of C-banks.
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics in Capital Requirement θ
Top left: share of S-banks, top right: consumption, bottom left: utility from liquidity services,
bottom right: total household utility.
Welfare is higher when the government is less likely to bail out shadow banking liabilities.
This is intuitive as shadow banks endogenously choose to be safer when they can expect
less government support. Moreover, the optimal capital requirement is higher in the low piB
economy. The intuition for this effect is the following. Since higher capital requirements shift
activity towards the shadow banking system, a cost of a higher capital requirement is the
deadweight loss caused by a higher shadow banking share. At low values of piB, shadow banks
are relatively safe, causing little deadweight losses even when the S-bank share is increased.
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The higher piB, the higher the deadweight losses inflicted by a larger shadow banking sector.
4 Results
We are now ready to study the properties of the model and its implication for optimal
regulation.
4.1 Parametrization
We match the model to quarterly data. We use data from the Flow of Funds,18 Compustat,
FRED, NIPA, and focus on the period between 1999 (after the passage of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act that revoked parts of the Glass-Steagall Act) until the last quarter of 2014.
We choose depository institutions as data counterparts for C−banks and shadow bank
institutions as data counterparts for S−banks where we define shadow banks in the flow of
funds data as security broker and dealer, finance companies, GSEs, and asset-backed security
issuers when using sector definitions from the Flow of Fund. The Compustat based definition
of shadow banks mirrors that definition.19
The stochastic process for the Y-tree (not intermediated by banks) is a AR(1) in logs
log(Yt+1) = (1− ρY )log(µY ) + ρY log(Yt) + Yt+1,
where Yt is i.i.d. with mean zero and volatility σ
Y . To capture the correlation of asset payoffs
with fundamental income shocks, we model the payoff of the intermediated asset as
Zt = φ
ZYt exp(
Z
t ),
18The Flow of Funds tables are organized according to institutions and instruments. We focus on the
balance sheet information on institutions. This is important, as we want to take into account all bank and
shadow-bank positions when we quantify the model.
19We include financial institutions with the following SIC code 6111-6299, 6799, 6722, 6726, excluding
6200, 6282, 6022.
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where Zt is i.i.d. with mean zero and volatility σ
Z , independent of Yt . This structure of the
shocks implies that Zt inherits all stochastic properties of aggregate income Yt, and is subject
to an additional temporary shock that reflects risks specific to intermediated assets, such as
credit risk.
For the investment technology, we choose a standard quadratic adjustment cost20
Φ(It) =
φ
2
I2t .
Our choice of parameters is listed in table 1. The table groups parameters according to
the method through which they have been choosen: normalization, directly set to a data
counterpart, matching unconditional first moments, and matching unconditional second mo-
ments.
In order to parametrize the shock processes we use Flow of Funds tables S.1 and S.6 to
obtain a time series for the value added of the financial sector and GDP which we deflate
and express in GDP per capita using NIPA data. Normalizing the mean of per capita real
GDP growth process to µY = 0.5 we can derive σY and ρY from the observed volatility and
autocorrelation. Similarly, using the per capital real financial sector value added time series
(and its observed volatility), we find a value for the scale of the intermediated asset payoff
φZ and σZ .
The fraction of households that defaults each period is %t and follows a Markov-process
that takes two values: zero in the first state (no run) and 0.3 in the second state (run state),
i.e. 30% of depositors run on shadow banks. In the simulation, bank runs occur only in
bad economic states. We interpret the run on shadow banks in the model as akin to a run
on ABCP programs and repurchase agreements (e.g. Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2013) and
Gorton and Metrick (2012)). Commercial paper and repurchase agreements are common
20This implies the usual first-order condition for investment It =
pt−1
φ .
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funding sources for dealer banks and finance companies. We pick a household run fraction of
30% based on Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2013)’s observation that 30% of ABCP programs
experienced a run at the beginning of the crisis. We set the transition probability between
bank run and non-bank run states to target an unconditional probability of a bank-run of
3%, i.e. there is one bank run every 33 years, roughly consistent with the past 100 years of
U.S. banking history.
We set κ, the deposit insurance fee to 0.0006168. This is in the range of quarterly FDIC
assessment rates.
The key parameters for our quantitative results have been choosen to match unconditional
first and second moments. The size of the capital stock is mainly affected by β. This is
intuitive because β determines the saving propensity of agents. The larger β, the higher are
the incentives, leading to a larger capital stock, i.e. financial assets in this economy, relative
to GDP. We target thus the ratio of financial assets to GDP using Flow of Funds data.
The value of liquidity provision is mainly determined by three key preference parameters:
the elasticity of substitution between shadow bank and commercial bank liquidity services
(α =1 − 1/elasticity), the weight on liquidity services ψ, and the parameter ν that governs
the sensitivity of the liquidity quality of shadow banking debt. To fix ideas, it is useful to
interpret commercial bank debt as deposits and shadow bank debt as money market mutual
fund shares.
We choose these three parameters as follows. Deposits and money market mutual fund
shares are similar in terms of risk and liquidity and hence produce liquidity services but
they are not perfectly substitutable. For example money market mutual fund shares cannot
be used directly for transactions in contrast to most deposits. In the model the degree of
substitutability between these two securities is governed by α. Both bank types differ mainly
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in terms of their differences in liquidity service, thus α helps to pin down the size of the size
of commercial banks relative to shadow banks. We target Gallin (2013)’s estimate of the
33% share of shadow banks in total financial intermediation.21
The utility weight on liquidity services ψ affects how valuable liquidity services are rel-
ative to consumption. We target Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) estimate of
government debt liquidity services as a proxy for the liquidity of commercial banks ψ. We
choose nu, the shadow bank debt liquidity quality parameter, in order to match the rate
on shadow banking debt. Since many non-depository institutions rely substantially on the
commercial paper market we proxy the rate on shadow bank debt by the commercial paper
rate on financial institutions (3-month financial commercial paper rate from FRED).
We choose the bailout probability piB to match the market value leverage of shadow banks
in Compustat. That is, we compute the value weighted leverage of publicly traded shadow
banks22 as debt over assets weighted by the relative market value of each institution and
average across time and banks. The result is a value-weighted leverage ratio of 94%. The
volatility of the idiosyncratic valuations shocks σS and σC proxy the relative riskiness of
investment opportunities for banks. As a target for these two parameter, we choose the
cross–sectional volatility of Tobin’s q (market value of assets relative to book value) for
depository institutions and shadow banks in Compustat.
The utility penality parmaeters δS and δC for bank managers determines the default
threshold level of bank leverage. We choose δC to target a 1% annual default rate of com-
mercial banks. The choice of the data counterpart is not trivial. FDIC data suggests a
21More precisely, Gallin (2013) used data from the Flow of Funds to carefully trace back how much shadow
banking sector funding the real economy received. Since many shadow banks fund each other and not
necessarily real activity the actual share of shadow activity is much lower (around 33%) than what one would
expect given the total asset size of the financial sector.
22We define shadow banks as all institutions with SIC codes 6111-6299, 6799, 6722, 6726, excluding SIC
codes 6200, 6282, 6022, 6199.
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higher rate (4%), mainly driven by smaller less important banks, while Moody reports typi-
cally suggest a lower rate (0.6% for the entire banking sector). We choose the parameter δS
to target the spread between the non-jumbo 3-month deposit rate and the 3-month financial
commercial paper rate from FRED.
The bankruptcy cost parameters ξS and ξC are relevant for the deadweight loss from bank
default. We choose a bankruptcy costs of 37% to target a recovery rate of 63% from Moody
reports on financial sector bond recoveries.23
23We use Moody’s 1984-2004 . Exhibit 9 in the report presents the recovery rates of defaulted bond for
financial institutions. We use the mean for financial institutions over all bonds and preferred stocks.
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Table 1: Parametrization
Values Target Data Model
µY 0.5 normalization
µCρ 1 normalization
µSρ 1 normalization
set directly
φZ 0.075 Val add. FinSec/GDP
δK 0.025 set to imply 10% annual depreciation
γ 2 B. H.
θ 0.1 policy parameter
κ 0.000617 insurance fee
σY 0.00716 vol of GDP net of financial sector
δY 0.268 AC of net of fin GDP
µZ 0.04 µY × φZ
σZ 0.05646 vol of fin val added
run
δK 0.05 haircut (discount) xt 75% 77%
% 0 0.3 fraction of households run Covitz et al 2013
Prob% [0.93; 0.07 0.4; 0.6] uncond. run prob. 3% 3%
Z 0.9 Z in run state
calibrated
β 0.9797 fin assets relative to GDP 3.33 3.17
α 0.66 shadow banking share Gallin 33% 33%
ψ 0.037 match liquidity premium KV2012 73 bp 127 bp
ν 85 match rate on AA Financial CP 0.65% 0.90%
δS 0.49 S-Cbank debt spread 0.60% 0.10%
δC 0.125 default rate C FDIC quarterly 0.25% 0.22%
ξC 0.5565 recovery rate Moody’s 37% 37%
ξS 0.14 recovery rate Moody’s 37% 37%
piB 0.55 Sbank leverage Compustat 94% 94%
2nd moments
σρC 0.09 vol(mkt assets/assets) 0.07 0.10
σρS 0.25 vol(mkt assets/assets) 0.49 0.40
φ 2 vol(financial sector asset growth) 0.021 0.007
37
4.2 Solution Method and Aggregate State Variables
We solve the dynamic model using nonlinear methods. To do so, we write the equilibrium
of the economy as a system of nonlinear functional equations of the state variables, with the
unknown functions being the agents’ choices, the asset prices, and the Lagrange multiplier on
the C-bank’s leverage constraint. We parametrize these functions using splines and iterate
on the system until convergence. We check the relative Euler equation errors at the solution
we obtain to make sure the unknown functions are well approximated. We then simulate the
model for many periods and compute moments of the simulated series.
The model has three exogenous state variables, the stochastic endowment Yt, productivity
Zt, and the run shock %t. These shocks are joint discretized as a first-order Markov chain
with three nodes for Yt and three nodes for Zt. We assume that runs only occur in low
productivity states, yielding a total of 12 different discrete states.
The model further has four endogenous aggregate state variables. These are (1) the
aggregate capital stock Kt = K
S
t + K
C
t , the debt outstanding relative to bank capital stock
by each type of bank at the beginning of the period (2) bSt and (3) b
C
t , and (4) the share of
capital held by one type of bank, e.g.
KSt
Kt
. Inspecting the optimization problem for S-banks
and C-banks, it is obvious that the value functions vS and vC do not depend on past portfolio
choices of the bank. Why then are the debt of both types of banks and the share of capital
held by each type aggregate state variables? The reason is that the level of debt of each
type determines household utility from liquidity, and these quantities are therefore aggregate
state variables for households. Furthermore, in combination which each type’s capital share,
the outstanding debt determines beginning-of-period leverage Ljt , which in turn determines
household wealth and consumption (alternatively, we could choose household wealth as an
additional state variable directly).
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4.3 Benchmark Economy
Table (2) reports means, standard deviations, business cycle correlations (correlations with
Y), correlations with Z and %, as well as autocorrelations, for the benchmark economy with
θ = 10%.
The price for the intermediated asset moves together with Y and Z. Good times make
intermediation more valuable. Co-movements with Z are not surprising, while co-movements
with Y are induced by the complementarity between consumption and liquidity on the de-
mand side and the loosening of the leverage constraint (regulatory and endogenous respec-
tively) on the supply side. The deposit rates for commercial and shadow banks are counter-
cyclical in the Z shock. Time variation in the interest rate is caused by (i) the standard
intertemporal consumption smoothing motive, and (ii) fluctuations in the marginal benefit
of liquidity. While the first source of variation induces the usual procyclical movement with
GDP shocks, the second source causes interest rates to be very countercyclical in the Z pay-
off. The return on equity for both types of banks is of similar magnitude – the expected
excess return for both types is around 1.5 percentage points. Both bank’s equity returns
contain countercyclical risk premia.
The liquidity quality factor ΛS is decisively procyclical as shadow banks’ survive with
higher likelihood in good times. During run states liquidity quality deterioriates. The con-
venience yields measure the marginal benefit of liquidity and are components of the bond
prices qC and qS. These convenience yields are quantitatively large given our calibration. In
states with low payoffs of the Z asset, banks tighten their supply of debt that yields liquidity
services, leading to a high marginal benefit and high convenience yields during those times.
The model captures counter-cyclical market value leverage for both banks. The balance
sheet of commercial banks moves with Z, a reflection of a relaxed leverage constraint in good
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Table 2: This table presents moments of key variables of the benchmark economy (θ = 10%).
Mean SD Corr Y Corr Z Corr % AC
Prices
Capital Price 1.082 0.015 0.705 0.788 -0.153 0.138
Deposit Rate S 0.009 0.012 -0.595 -0.869 0.154 0.098
Deposit Rate C 0.008 0.012 -0.591 -0.871 0.178 0.097
EER Equity S 0.014 0.001 -0.612 -0.800 0.072 0.220
EER Equity C 0.015 0.001 -0.594 -0.788 0.110 0.217
Liquidity
ΛS 0.808 0.058 0.547 0.873 -0.229 0.041
Convenience Yield S 0.013 0.000 -0.267 -0.380 0.699 0.525
Convenience Yield C 0.013 0.000 -0.490 -0.517 -0.055 0.682
Quantities
Capital Stock 1.603 0.037 0.069 0.002 0.019 0.977
Debt S 0.535 0.083 0.154 0.014 -0.070 0.114
Debt C 1.031 0.055 -0.097 -0.011 0.103 0.090
Capital Share S 0.329 0.049 0.148 0.014 -0.077 0.058
Asset Value S 0.571 0.090 0.210 0.081 -0.082 0.195
Asset Value C 1.163 0.082 0.005 0.136 0.055 -0.100
Leverage S 0.937 0.012 -0.676 -0.794 0.151 0.057
Leverage C 0.888 0.020 -0.245 -0.451 0.072 -0.376
Early Liquidation Share 0.010 0.053 0.012 -0.215 1.000 0.159
Bankruptcy Losses
DWL S 0.02% 0.06% -0.008 -0.246 0.976 0.081
DWL C 0.10% 0.09% -0.244 -0.527 0.112 -0.310
Default Rate S 0.25% 0.09% -0.548 -0.865 0.233 0.039
Default Rate C 0.22% 0.21% -0.233 -0.510 0.103 -0.311
Utility
Liquidity 1.957 0.123 0.571 0.790 -0.205 0.271
Consumption 0.518 0.004 0.685 0.697 -0.124 0.361
Aggregate Welfare -83.815 0.077 0.393 0.303 -0.058 0.896
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states.24
Overall, the financial sector is more stable in good economic times as default risk is lower.
On the flipside, deadweight losses due to intermediary bankruptcy are higher in bad states
of the economy, in particular those bad states that affect the financial sector the most (low
Z payoffs).
4.4 Shadow Bank Runs
Shadow banks are fragile in our model because they experience occasional large deposit
outflows that force them to incur fire-sale losses on their assets. These infrequent episodes
of shadow bank fragility quantitatively capture a possible downside of too much shadow
banking activity that is absent in the deterministic version of the model.
Runs on the deposits of shadow banks (% > 0) cause shadow banks to shrink their balance
sheets. They lose capital share and issue less debt. At the same time, their default rate spikes
and the quality of the liquidity services they provide (ΛS) drops. Interestingly, shadow bank
deposit rates fall during these periods. Due to the high bailout probability (70%), interest
rates only reflect credit risk partially, but the drop in shadow bank liquidity raises its marginal
benefit. This quantity effect dominates the compensation for increased bankruptcies.
In figure 4 and figure 5 we compare the impulse response functions to a low realization of
Z (low productivity in the financial sector) (blue line), to one with a low Z realization and
a run on the shadow banking sector (red line). The benchmark unconditional economy is in
black. A run on shadow bank deposits leads to a higher default rate in the shadow banking
sector (figure 4 top left), causing shadow banking debt to be less liquid (figure 4 bottom left),
and a lower overall production of liquidity services in this economy (figure 4 bottom right).
24We designed the leverage constraint to reflect a Basel II type of capital requirement that has been
criticized for its procyclical effects.
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The default rate in the commercial banking sector is higher during a crisis without a run,
while the opposite is true for shadow banks.
The aggregate consequences of a crisis with a run on the shadow banking sector is signif-
icantly worse. Even though the difference in output is negligible, the fall in the aggregate
capital stock, investment and consumption is more dramatic. The larger negative response
in consumption has to do with a higher savings need in order to make up for the fall in
investment and the capital stock (figure 5). Since investment is subject to adjustment costs,
the large initial impact in the run-crisis has persistent effects over many years (x-axis is in
quarters).
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Figure 4: Dynamic Response to Low Z
Graphs show the dynamic responses of model variables to a regular low payoff shock for the
intermediated asset (blue line) and a low payoff shock combined with a run on shadow banks
(red line), compared to the unconditional evolution of all variables (black line). Responses
are the mean paths of 1000 model simulations for 25 periods.
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Figure 5: Dynamic Response to Low Z
Graphs show the dynamic responses of model variables to a regular low payoff shock for the
intermediated asset (blue line) and a low payoff shock combined with a run on shadow banks
(red line), compared to the unconditional evolution of all variables (black line). Responses
are the mean paths of 1000 model simulations for 25 periods.
4.5 Welfare
There is a unique maximum in aggregate welfare from increasing the capital requirement
θ. We consider two cases for the effect of a change in the capital requirement. First, we
compare economies with different θ for the benchmark calibration with a bailout probability
of piB =55%. In this case, a capital requirement around 15 percent is welfare maximizing.
The main forces leading to this result are the same as we already discussed for the steady
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state. Increasing θ makes the debt of commercial banks safer, thus reducing bankruptcy
losses and increasing aggregate consumption. At the same time, a higher level of θ restricts
the amount of liabilities and thus liquidity commercial banks can produce for each unit of
assets.
We also consider the benefit of an increase in θ for a lower bailout probability of piB =15%.
In this economy, the baseline leverage and failure rate of shadow banks is lower, which implies
a larger gain from increasing the capital requirement. As in the deterministic economy (see
figure 3), a lower bailout probability increases shadow banks’ incentives to take into account
the risks they face when choosing leverage.
Baseline (piB =55%) The middle panel of table 3 shows that an increase in the capital
requirement shifts a greater fraction of the intermediated asset to shadow banks. Restricting
the liquidity production by commercial banks increases the marginal benefit of liquidity to
households. Shadow banks take advantage of the lower funding costs by holding more of the
intermediated assets.
Shadow banks do not increase their leverage in response to the scaling back of commercial
banks. Rather, they keep their leverage roughly constant. Overall liquidity production falls
monotonically as long as the liquidity produced by S-banks is less valuable to households
than that produced by C-banks (which is the case as long as ΛS < 1).
Commercial banks become safer as the capital requirement is raised, leading to overall
fewer deadweight losses and higher consumption. However, in the dynamic model increasing
the requirement leads to greater liquidity volatility. For the risk-averse household, this leads
to a small offsetting effect, making the overall welfare gain smaller than in the steady state.
The result is that total welfare already becomes decreasing in the capital requirement before
all bankruptcy losses are eliminated; in other words, our calibrated model says that it is not
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Table 3: Model Moments for Different Capital Requirements
10% 15% 20%
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
Prices
Capital Price 1.082 0.015 1.082 0.015 1.081 0.015
Deposit Rate S 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.012
Deposit Rate C 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.012
EER Equity S 0.014 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.016 0.001
EER Equity C 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.016 0.001
Liquidity
ΛS 0.808 0.058 0.811 0.057 0.808 0.059
Convenience Yield S 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000
Convenience Yield C 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.014 0.000
Quantities
Debt S 0.535 0.083 0.589 0.089 0.625 0.095
Debt C 1.031 0.055 0.942 0.055 0.850 0.055
Capital Share S 0.329 0.049 0.358 0.051 0.381 0.055
Asset Value S 0.571 0.090 0.629 0.096 0.667 0.103
Asset Value C 1.163 0.082 1.128 0.087 1.082 0.092
Leverage S 0.937 0.012 0.936 0.012 0.937 0.013
Leverage C 0.888 0.020 0.837 0.020 0.787 0.019
Early Liquidation Share 0.010 0.053 0.008 0.047 0.008 0.046
Utility
Liquidity 1.957 0.123 1.916 0.124 1.837 0.128
Consumption 0.518 0.004 0.519 0.004 0.519 0.004
Aggregate Welfare 1.17% 0.53%
Bankruptcy Losses
DWL S 0.02% 0.06% 0.02% 0.06% 0.02% 0.07%
DWL C 0.10% 0.09% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
Default Rate S 0.25% 0.09% 0.25% 0.08% 0.25% 0.09%
Default Rate C 0.22% 0.21% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00%
a: Deadweight losses are in units of the consumption good, multiplied by factor 100.
b: Welfare is the percentage change of mean and volatility of the household value
function relative to the benchmark model with θ = 0.1.
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optimal to make commercial banks completely safe.
Table 4: Different Capital Requirements at piB = 15%
10% 15% 20%
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
Utility
Liquidity 2.100 0.091 2.047 0.094 1.984 0.091
Consumption 0.518 0.004 0.519 0.004 0.519 0.004
Aggregate Welfare 0.077% 0.53%
Bankruptcy Losses
DWL S 0.017% 0.073% 0.018% 0.076% 0.015% 0.069%
DWL C 0.109% 0.093% 0.011% 0.011% 0.001% 0.001%
Default Rate S 0.114% 0.042% 0.115% 0.042% 0.114% 0.042%
Default Rate C 0.253% 0.217% 0.027% 0.028% 0.002% 0.002%
a: Deadweight losses are in units of the consumption good, multiplied by factor 100.
b: Welfare is the percentage change of mean and volatility of the household value function
relative to the benchmark model with θ = 0.1.
Lower Bailout Probability (piB =15%) Shadow banks have more incentives to inter-
nalize the credit risk of their bonds when the bailout probability is lower. This leads to half
the default rates of shadow banks compared with the benchmark calibration (see Table 4).
The table further shows that the overall level of welfare is higher (more liquidity provision
due to higher shadow banking liquidity quality at about the same level of consumption and
less volatility) when shadow banks are safer. Since an increase in θ shifts intermediation
activity towards shadow banks, the optimal capital requirement has to trade-off a reduction
in deadweight losses due to commercial banks against an increase in deadweight losses due
to shadow banks. If those banks have a lower failure rate and cause fewer bankruptcy losses,
then for each dollar of intermediated assets shifted to shadow banks there is a greater re-
duction in deadweight losses. This provides more scope for ameliorating incentives for moral
hazard in the commercial banking sector. The optimal capital requirement is in the interval
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between 15% and 20%.
This exercise shows that the potential benefit from higher capital requirements depends
on the response of non-regulated banks in the economy. In our calibration, reducing implicit
bailout guarantees for shadow banks at the same time, turns out to increase the benefit of
raising capital requirement.
Fair Deposit Insurance Fee & Time Varying Capital Requirement Table 5 com-
pares the benchmark economy to an environment with a time-varying insurance fee κt and
to an economy with a time-varying capital requirement.
We implement the fair deposit insurance fee experiment as follows: we set κ each period
such that in expectation all the bankruptcy losses from defaulting commercial banks can
be fully covered. In a world without shadow banks, this would make commercial banks
internalize their deadweight losses caused by their high leverage. However, the main effect of
such a policy in our model is to shift intermediation activity to shadow banks. While both
types of banks become slightly safer, i.e. lower default rates, the net effect is still a shift
from the relatively safer sector to the relatively less safe sector. Similar to a higher capital
requirement, the fair insurance fee reduces the size of the commercial banking sector. But
unlike an increased capital requirement, the higher insurance fee does not limit the leverage
of commercial banks. Therefore increasing κt to its fair value leads to a welfare loss, as it
produces a reduction in liquidity but no gain in consumption.
Our next experiment is a time varying capital requirement. That is, we set the capital
requirement such that commercial banks’ expected default rate is less than 25 basis points
p.a. (6.25 bp per quarter). The resulting time varying capital requirement has a mean of
13%, a standard deviation of 1% and co-varies strongly with the business cycle. Leverage
and default rates of commercial banks becomes more counter-cyclical, while the overall level
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is lower, reducing financial fragility. When the capital requirement allows commercial banks
to temporarily increase leverage during bad economic times they become more vulnerable
to adverse economic shocks. This tends to increase the co-movements of default rates and
deadweight losses from bankruptcy with bad states.
In contrast to the fair insurance premium case, intermediation activity of shadow banks
does not pick up because the subsidized commercial banks can offer competitive rates. At the
same time, an overall higher level of the capital requirement (13 percent compared to the 10
percent benchmark) requires commercial banks to lower their leverage. Altogether this means
that the economy produces less liquidity. Moreover, since commercial bank deadweight-losses
are more counter-cyclical, consumption becomes more procyclical, which risk-averse agents
dislike. The reduction in liquidity and more pro-cyclical consumption leads to a substantial
welfare loss compared to the benchmark case.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel model to study the consequences of higher bank capital re-
quirements for the economy. The optimal level of capital regulation trades-off a reduction in
liquidity services against an increase in the safety of the banking system and consumption.
Increasing the capital requirement for regulated banks leads to more intermediation activity
by the shadow banking system. Moreover, a higher capital requirement makes regulated
banks safer, but it does not affect the riskiness of unregulated banks. Since a higher capital
requirement shifts intermediated assets to unregulated banks, the net benefit of such a policy
depends on baseline level of fragility of the unregulated banks. The qualitative finding that a
higher capital requirement increases welfare is robust across our different policy experiments.
However, our quantitative results highlight the role of additional policy measures that affect
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Table 5: Effect of Fair Insurance Fee & Time Varying Capital Requirement
baseline fair kappa time varying theta
mean stdev Corr Y mean stdev Corr Y mean stdev Corr Y
Liquidity
ΛS 0.808 0.058 0.547 0.822 0.054 0.537 0.811 0.057 0.520
Convenience Yield S 0.013 0.000 -0.267 0.012 0.001 -0.492 0.013 0.000 -0.265
Convenience Yield C 0.013 0.000 -0.490 0.013 0.000 0.304 0.013 0.000 -0.249
Quantities
Debt S 0.535 0.083 0.154 0.646 0.156 0.131 0.571 0.096 0.148
Debt C 1.031 0.055 -0.097 0.888 0.122 -0.120 0.981 0.074 -0.119
Capital Share S 0.329 0.049 0.148 0.416 0.093 0.129 0.346 0.056 0.143
Asset Value S 0.571 0.090 0.210 0.726 0.170 0.167 0.608 0.103 0.198
Asset Value C 1.163 0.082 0.005 1.017 0.157 -0.067 1.147 0.095 -0.021
Leverage S 0.937 0.012 -0.676 0.933 0.012 -0.673 0.936 0.012 -0.658
Leverage C 0.888 0.020 -0.245 0.883 0.020 -0.259 0.861 0.013 -0.488
Utility
Liquidity 1.957 0.123 0.571 1.917 0.113 0.536 1.941 0.110 0.538
Consumption 0.518 0.004 0.685 0.518 0.004 0.663 0.519 0.004 0.698
Aggregate Welfare -0.77% -5.18%
Bankruptcy Losses
DWL S 0.02% 0.06% -0.008 0.02% 0.08% 0.001 0.02% 0.07% 0.008
DWL C 0.10% 0.09% -0.244 0.07% 0.06% -0.288 0.03% 0.02% -0.426
Default Rate S 0.25% 0.09% -0.548 0.23% 0.08% -0.537 0.25% 0.08% -0.520
Default Rate C 0.22% 0.21% -0.233 0.18% 0.18% -0.234 0.06% 0.04% -0.402
Time var. cap reqs 13% 1.03% 0.572
a: Deadweight losses are in units of the consumption good, multiplied by factor 100.
b: Welfare is the percentage change of mean and volatility of the household value function relative to the benchmark
model with θ = 0.1.
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unregulated banks such as implicit bailout guarantees. Our results further indicate that a
higher deposit insurance fee does not make commercial banks safer. Rather, it shifts inter-
mediation activity to the more fragile shadow banks without limiting leverage of commercial
banks. Finally time-varying capital requirement successfully reduce financial fragility at the
expense of lower liquidity provision.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dynamic Model
A.1.1 FOC for bSt
Rewrite FS(LSt ) as
FS(LSt ) = (1− F St )
(
ρS,+t (1− `t(1− xt))− LSt
)
− F St δS
= (1− `t(1− xt))
ˆ
LSt −δS
1−`t(1−xt)
ρ dF (ρ)− (1− F St )LSt − F St δS.
Further compute
∂(1− `t(1− xt))
∂LSt
= −%St
1− xt
xt
= −`t1− xt
LSt
.
and define
LSt (LSt ) =
∂
∂LSt
LSt − δS
1− `t(1− xt) =
1− δS%St 1−xtxt
(1− `t(1− xt))2 =
1− δS`t 1−xtLSt
(1− `t(1− xt))2 .
Now we can calculate
FS(LSt )
∂LSt
= −`t1− xt
LSt
(1− F St )ρS,+t − fSt LSt (LSt )(LSt − δS)− (1− F St ) + fSt LSt (LSt )LSt − fSt LSt (LSt )δS
= −(1− F St )
(
1 + `t(1− xt)ρ
S,+
t
LSt
)
.
Therefore the FOC for bSt is
qSt = −bSt q′(bSt ) + Et
[
Mt+1(1− F St )
(
1 + `t(1− xt)ρ
S,+
t
LSt
)]
.
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A.1.2 Derivation of (qS)′(bSt )
Recall the definition of the recovery value for S-banks as
rS(LSt ) = (1− ξS)
ρS,−t (1− `t(1− xt))
LSt
,
with the conditional expectation
ρS,−t = Eρ,S
[
ρ | ρ < L
S
t − δS
1− `t(1− xt)
]
.
First compute
∂
∂LSt
1− `t(1− xt)
LSt
=
−%St 1−xtxt LSt − (1− `t(1− xt))
(LSt )
2
= − 1
(LSt )
2
.
We can rewrite the recovery value times the probability of default as
F St r
S
t =
(1− ξS)(1− `t(1− xt))
LSt
ˆ LSt −δS
1−`t(1−xt)
−∞
ρ dFρ,S(ρ).
Differentiating this expression with respect to bSt gives
∂F St r
S
t
LSt
=− (1− ξS)
(LSt )
2
F St ρ
S,−
t +
fSt
LSt
(1− ξS)LSt (LSt )(LSt − δ)
= − F
S
t r
S
t
LSt (1− `t(1− xt))
− f
S
t
bSt
LSt (LSt )(1− ξS)(δ − LSt ).
Using LSt = b
S
t /(Zt+pt), the complete derivative of the household’s bond pricing equation
for qS (16) with respect to bSt+1 is therefore
∂qS(bSt+1)
∂bSt+1
= −Et
{
(1− piB)Mt,t+1
[
F St+1r
S
t+1
bSt+1(1− `t+1(1− xt+1))
+
fSt+1
bSt+1
LS(LSt+1)
(
(1− ξS)δS + ξSLSt+1
)]}
.
A.1.3 Gamma Distribution
The gamma cdf is Γ(ρ; χ0, χ1) with parameters (χ0, χ1). The parameters map into mean and
variance of the distribution as
χ1 = σ
2
ρ/µρ
χ0 = µρ/χ1.
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Denote the pdf as γ(ρ; χ0, χ1).
It is a standard result is statistics that the conditional expectations are
E(ρ | ρ < x) = µρΓ(x; χ0 + 1, χ1)
Γ(x; χ0, χ1)
,
E(ρ | ρ > x) = µρ1− Γ(x; χ0 + 1, χ1)
1− Γ(x; χ0, χ1) .
This means the expressions for payoffs and recovery values are
F jρρ
j,− = µρΓ(
Ljt − δj
1− `jt(1− xt)
; χ0 + 1, χ1),
(1− F jρ )ρj,+ = µρ(1− Γ(
Ljt − δS
1− `jt(1− xt)
; χ0 + 1, χ1)).
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